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I, INTRODUCTION 
Theoretical models of underdeveloped countries often draw policy con~ 
clusions concerning various development strategies without explicitly tak­
ing into accom1t the role of the government. The focus is usually on the 
relationship between agriculture and industry rather than between the pri-
vate and public sectors. Yet to :lgnore. the specific contribution of the 
government as a provider of crucial development inputs or to fail to con­
sider the government as a decision maker having its mm set of preferences 
is to omit an important part of the development model. The purpose of 
this paper is t~ introd~ce the government as a sector having its own set 
of objectives, instruments, and constraints and to explore the resulting 
interactions between the government and the private sector. 
Thf2.re are a number of important characteristics of the government sec-
tor in underdevelopec countries that deserve special attention. First, a 
significant share of government activity in developing countries has a di­
rectly productive effect on other sectors of the economy. Goverrnaent fi­
nanced infrastructure and education, for example, ofte:i form a major part 
of the physical and human capital stock of the c.ountry. Government ser--
vices in transportation, communications, research, peace and order, etc. 
are intennediate goods which affect the level of proauctivity in the pri­
vate sector. Expenditure policy is thus a crucial instrument of dev~lop­
ment strategy. 
Second, the capacity· of the government to earn revenue is limited 
severely by the costs of collecting taxes·and by political and ideoloe;ical 
constraints on the tax structure. In many underdeveloped countries, the 
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largest share of revenue is derived from indire.ct taxes on a limited num­
ber of exported or imported commodities. The revenue of the. government 
depends therefore upon the growth of taxable sectors. 
Finally~ the government sector can appropriately be viewed as an in·­
stitution within society having its own goals and preferences1some of 
which may be in harmony \Tith the objectives of the private sector and 
some of which may be in conflict. These goals are determined by the sue-
cifj_c political process of the country and reflect the interests and power 
of various pressure groups as well as the desi.res of the state bureaucracy 
and ambitions of the rulin8 elite. In technical terns, we cannot assume 
the government is in all cases attempting to achieve Pareto efficiency for 
the country as a whole but instead we must vie,-, the government as maximiz·­
ing specific goals of its m-m subject to. specific constraints.* 
These·principles of productive expenditure, J.j_mited tax capacity, and 
specific government
i 
preference functions, taken together, imply a quasi-
market mechanism to determine the growth of the gpverDment sector and its 
impact on the private sector. If government expenditure policies fail to 
stimulate the growth of the economy, and in particular those sectors from 
·which it derives its taxes, government revenue ceases to grow, and its ex­
pansion must come to a halt. For survival and s~owth~ the government must 
allocate some of its resources in directions that will generate income. 
This, however, sets limits on government behavior within which it chooses 
according to its preference function. 






The Ref lect:lon Ratios 
Formally, we may derive the relevant relationship between the private 
and public sectors as follows. The size of the government sector is con-­
strained by its budget equation 
(1. 1) G = R + B 
·where G equals total expenditures,; R total revenue and B net borrowing. 
Ignoring B for the moment, the size of G and its rate of growth through 
time depends upon the level and rate of growth of R. The point of de­
parture for this article is that there is a funct!onal dependence of R 
upon G which may be called the reflection ratio. 
Our first principle noted above says that the level of activity of 
various sectors of the economy is functionally related to the expendi­
ture policy of the government. This relatior:.ship can be ,-,ritten as 
(1. 2) X = F(g) 
where Xis a vector of indices of economic private economic activity, and 
g a government expenditure vector whose elements (g1 , g 2 , .. ,gn) denote 
the level of activity of a particular government function.• ;~ 
The second principle states that government revenue will depend unon 
the vector of private economic activities 
(1. 3) R = tX 
where R equals total revenue. and tis a tax vector whose elements are the~ 
given tax rates associated with each private economic activity. We as­
sume for this paper that the tax structure represented by this•vector 
*He assume the following conditions:· 
ax a2xX = X if g = 0 , >_ 0, ~- < 0.a8 ag 
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tends to be stable over t:lme. Our primary concern is to analyze the 
effect of changing g, given t as a constraint. In underdeveloped coun­
tries, it can reasonably be argued that governments have only limited 
scope for changing t within a given economic structure, In the short 
run it can thus be viewed as exogeneous. An analysis of changes int, 
especially the discontinuous jumps that occur with economic revolution, 
is beyond the scope of the present paper.* 
Combining these equations we obtain the reflection ratio 
(1.4) G = t F(g) + B 
which indicates that the level of government expenditures is· functionally 
determined by its composition. 
Another type of reflection ratio can be devised as follows. The 
government sector requires certain inputs from the rest of the economy, 
e.g., imported goods, labor~ raw materials, etc. But government expen-
diture influences the supply curve of these inputs. Government help to 
export industries, for example, increases. the supply of foreign exchange, 
while government help to a3riculture lowers the price of food and hence 
the supply price of labor and intermediate goods, and government ex~endi­
ture on educatior;. increases the supply of skilled personnel. These rela-
*Although we are assuming this feature _as a stylized fact of underde­
veloped countries, considerable empirical estimation remains to be done. 
This hypothesis implies that _a regression of revenue on the level of activ­
ity in key sectors would yield stable parameters and a high correlation co­
efficient over long periods of time. It is to be expected that the struc·­
ture might shift at given points of time such as when a country moves from, 
colonial to independent status but that it would remain stable within a 
given period. Data exist for testing this hypothesis, though the relevant 
investigations have not yet been made. · 
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tionships generate a second type of feedback of government expenditure 
on government expenditure. 
This general relationship between governmental inputs and its o~m 
expenditure can be illustrated in the following simple model. Assume 
the government uses only one factor of production, labor (L), and the 
amour.t it can employ is equal t.o total revenue (E) divided "by the wage 
rate (w), If we define the productivity of each worker as 2., the total 
output of the government sector is then given by 
(LS) 
·A certain portion of total government expenditure, say, g
2 
is assumed to 
have a direct effect on either the productivity of government labor (a) 







A Hodel of the Two Types of Reflection Rntios 
We can now summarize our basic relationship between the private and 
public sectors in the followinE, simplified set of equations:i 
(2 .1) 
(2. 2) gO = G - gl - ~'-'2 
(2. 3) R == pl (g.l) 
a(2. 4) - = p2(g2).
H 
*Fonnally, we may consider the government having a cost constraint
R = wL and a production relaUonship G = aL. Solving we derive (1.5) • 
. i-We have ignored net borrowing of the government (B) in this model. 
E~uation (2.2) s::ates that government activity can be divided into 
three kinds: g0 which has no directly productive effect on the economy 
in the period under consideration but is either a government consumption 
item or a long range development act:lvity; g
1 
which has a direct effect 
on output in the private sector and hence on the government's revenue as 
described by equation (2.3); and g2 which has a direct effect on either 
the productivity of labor in the government sector or its cost [equation. 
(2.4)]. The total output of the government as [!iven by (2.1) can then 
be rewri t·ten as 
This model can be seen schematically in Figure 1 which demonstrates 
the two feedback loops from government expenditure to ·8overnment expendi­
ture. This illustrates, for example, that even if the government is 
interested in maximizing deve~opment-expenditure such as g0 , it must spend 
certain sums on g
1_and g2 because of their indirect effects in producing 
FIGURE 1 




Bo~ G - gl - g2 
- R == o (o )· · · 1 c,l 
(\
- lJ --
II. THE GOVEPJlHEi:TT 1 S CEO ICE 
The problem confronting the government in choosing the optimal level 
and allocation of expenditure is illustrated in Figure 2. For the present 
we are considering only the first type of reflection ratios i.e. 9 pl or 
the feedback from increased tax revenue. As before, Bis set equal to zero. 
It is further assumed in the background that there are three sectors: x
1 
s 
a taxed export or manufacturing sector; x2 7 a non--taxed large agrarian and 
se.rvice sector uhich supplies an unlimited amount of labor at a .constant 
wage; and Gs the government sector whose activity affects x
1
. 
The reflection curve is pictured in quadrant I which shows the total 
level of government expenditure as a function of the amount allocated to 
g1• It is derived as follows~ 
Quadrant
-
IV shows the productivity 6£ the government on the private 
sector according t~ x
1 = F(g1
) where the curve is concave downward due 
to diminishing returns, F' > 0, F" < O. If the government set g
1 = 0, it 





Quadrant III indicates the relationship between activity in the pri-
vate sector and the tax revenue of the government. We have assumed taxes 
are a constant proportion of activity in x
1 
but could easily explore the 
case where taxes are. an inc·reasing or decreasing -proportion. It should be 
noted that we have assumed that taxes have no disincentive effect on pro-· 
duction. This is not realistic but could be relaxed by matine; the revenue 
function concave to the x
1 axis thereby changing the shape of the reflec­
tion curve in the first quadrant. 
I • 
FIGURE 2 
The Governm2nt' s Choice 
x, 
Hodel 
x1 e F(g1) Productivity of Government (F' > 0, 17n < O) 
R ~ t X1 Revenue Function 
R •• G Balanced Dudget {B "" 0) 
G ~ p1 (g1)_ R~flection Curve (p~ ~ O) 
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The second quadrant shows the relationship between revenue ~nd­
gove:rnrnent expenditure. Assuming a balanced budget, R :::: Gp the i;ela--
tJon.ship is a straight. 1.:l.ne with a li5° slope, 
The reflection curve in quadrant I tells us the total amount of 
government expenclitui.'.'e assoc:tated with any level of expenditure on g
1
• 
It :ts der:tve<l by choosing various initial levels of g
1 which determine 
Xl' then R,_ ,.md finally back onto G, :', 'I'he horizontal d:i.ffcrence between 
the· reflection curve and a l-15° line indicates the surpJ.ug available to 
What is the opt:l"mum point for the government? It is immed:tately 
evident thc:•.t there is no obvious single best point :l.n the absence of a 
sod.al welfare funct:!.on to evaluate the desirabi.l:tt:l.es of var.ious com·-
binat:!.ons of gover11.t"'Dent and private act1vi ty. ·Thus we must :lntroduce
' 
*Given our assumptions, the reflection. curve is the m:trror image of
-the product:lvity funcUon in quadrant IV, or Pi > 0, p1< O, ar:.d G :::: G1 when g 1 z: 0, We may also note that our E:econd type of""reflectlon rela-·




), could be derived :i.n a s0L1e1-1hat sim:i..lar manner g:tven- HR as in the foD.owins diagram: 
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our third principle of government behavior. It is unrealistic to assume 
that the government in underdeveloped countries always maximizes some 
vague notion of "general ,11elfare: 1 representing somehoH the comliined inter­
ests and views of the population as a ,friole. It is also unrealistic to 
assume that the government always strives to achieve Pareto optimality and 
then redistributes using lump· sum taxes anc: transfers. A particular 
government is pushed and pulled by its own views of the world and by polit­
ical pressures of various groups both internal and external. We assume 
instead that the government (i.e. the state) in an underdevelo:)ed country 
has its own welfare function possibly diff~rent from a large section of 
the private sector. It is aµpropriate therefore, to analyze problems in 
terms of the implications and contradictions of various possible social 
welfare functions. 




. The x1 sector, for example, may be a foreign firm oper-
ating in the export sector of no interest to the government except for 
the revenue.it provides through taxes which can then be spent on annies, 
monuments, or development. The government would then choose the point g1 , 
·where g
0 
is a maximum. t, 
Another crude assumption, with quite different effects, is that the 
government's only interest is in its total size .. It may, for example, try 
to maximize G regardless of composition because of the employment generat­
ing aspects. The government would then chose the point g1 where g0 is equal 
to zero. This is the point which maximiz·es the total size of x
1 as well 
;'/f,
'0 - Pl (gl) - gl
go is at a. maximum when 
<lgo 





of the particular assumptions of this model. A govermnent choosi~g 
this pol:t.cy would therefore obtain the largest possible combined em!}loyment 
in the export plus government.sector, at the expense of the rest of the econ~ 
omy if g0 were considered to be partly development expenditures with a long 
gestation period. 
In Fi.gure 3, we can stnnmarize the various distributions between g0 and 
g1 (quadrant I) from the government's point of vieu. A social welfare func­
_tion, U(g0 , g1) is drawn to indicate one possible solution equating the mar­
ginal rates of substitutfon and transformation. Qur two limiting points, 
A and B, are indicated to show the range of the government's choice. 
Neither of these extremes, however, is sufficient to describe govern­
ment behavior in a complex world. In actual fact, the· government will as­
sign utility weights to a number of objectives: employment, output, size 
of the private sector, degree of openness of the economy 1 etc. The proposi­
tion remains empirically empty as long as we do not lmoH the content of 
the government's preference function. Nonetheless, the above analysis con­
tains an important lesson for research on the structure and performance of 
economies and the evaluation of nation al income. The economic record 
of a country does not merely reflect technological production functions 
and factor supplies but also the tastes of the government. Models whtch 
omit this latter feature, and this is the case in most theoretical and~ ' 
Cempirical models of underdeveloped countries, are therefore 'i:ltispecified 






III. A BARGAINING MODEL 
The reflection ratio as derived in the pfJ2~~~1i~~··,sections focuses 
on the allocation of government expenditure solely from the point of view 
of the government itself. For a given tax rate, the government surplus 
go', rose to a maximum and then fell as.increasing amounts were spent en 
11productive11 activities, g1 or g2. Given the government's preference 
function, we were able to indicate the choice of the policy instrument, 
g0 , which maximized the government's objective function. 
The government, however, does not act in a vacuum since j_ts choice 
of expenditure policy has a direct effect .on output and profits in the 
private sector. A simple bargaining model, taking into account the pref­
erences of the private sector, can illustrate the regions of conflict and 
complementarity between the government and the private sector in the 
choice of policy instruments. 
In Figure 4, 
i
we have drawn an opportunity locus or bargaining curve 
between various combinations of the private surplus (net of taxes), n, 
and public surplus, g0 • It is obvious from our preceding analysis that 
variations int and g1 will affect the surplus of both the government and 
· private sector. If the economy is within the frontier, say at point A, 
then a change int or g
1 
will make both sectors )Jetter off by moving to, 
say, point Bon the frontier. There is then a complementary relationshipI 
between the two surpluses for given changes int or g1. Once at point Bi, 
however, a trade-off between private and public surplus exists and a paten­
. tial movement to point C must involve us tv"ith a political bargaining process 
or the specification of a sodal welfare·" function, U(g0 ~. ir), for the entire 
Figure 4· 
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economy. In the following discussion, we will derive this opportunity 
locus and provide some possible reasons why certain underdeveloped coun­
tries might end up within the frontier. 
The bargaining model is characterized by two equations relating the 
govern.rnent surplus (g
0
) and the private surplus. (ir) to the two policy in­
struments, the rate of tax on profits (t) and the level of productive ex­
penditure (r;1). The government surplus is defined as the excess of revenue 
over expenditure on g1 and the private surplus as after tax profits: 
(1) Government surplus equation 80 = trr - 81 
(2) Private surplus equation. fr .. (1 t) Tf 
where the range of the variables is restricted so that t lies between 0 
and 1, and g
0 
is always positi.ve. 
The family of government iso surplus curves will be U-shaped as 
pictured in Figure 5 (the diagram has been drm,m to scale using specific 
analytical functions described in the appendix). The slope of this 





The denominator of this expression, at, is always positive since 
for a given expcrditure on gl' ·an increase in the tax rate will increase 
revenue and hence the government surplus. The numerator is positive for 
low values of g1 and then becomes negative. As we saw in Figure 2, the 
governi~ent surplus at first increases for a given tax rate as more is 
spent on g
1 




1 (_d1T ) falls below 
1







It should be n<Jted in Figure 5 that the turning point occurs at large values 
of g
0 
the higher is t. The shape of the iso government surplus curve is 
thus negative and then positive as the numerator changes sign with increas­
ing g1. The turning pofot shifts upward and to the right for higher iso 
government surolus curves (the reader is again referred to the_appendix 
for a formal derivation using specific analytical functions). 
The iso l)rofits curve is much simpler to derive because an increase in 
g
1 
always has a positive effect on profits after tax uhile a;.1 increase in 
t ahmys has a negative effect. The slope of the iso profit curve is there­










= I (1 - t ) -<l,r (lgl - 1T d t 
( 
ogl !Setting dfr, [= 0 to derive our iso urofit curv__l::y we have 
.-1T









The iso gover.nment surnlus curve and the iso profit curve can be 
superimposed on an Edgeworth Bor,Jley type diagram (Figure 7). The tan-· 
gencies of iso profit and iso surolus curves yield a contract curve 
showing the trade-off betv1een ir and g,., id.th optimal combinations of t andV -
g1 • If we map the points on this contract curve onto a {fr, g0 
} space:1 
we then derive the opportunity locus as in Figure l}, 
A theory of bargaining as well as a theory of politics would be 
necessary to predict the eventual resting point.
~ 
He may for the moment 
confine ourselves to one case to illustrate that many countries may not 
be on the contract curve. 
Suppose we begin with a given tax rate e.. The government's expendi-
ture policy is then a straight line parallel to the g
1 axis and perpendicular 
to the taxis. As g1 increases:1 ~O increases up to point A and fi increases 
up to point B which is beyond A. Suppose the government chooses to maxj_-
i
mize g0 by restini at A. It is obvious that both parties could be made 
better off by increasing t and g
1 
in some combination that moves the economy 
to the contract curve. t!ill such a move necessarily occur? The private 
sector may very well resist it. It may prefer a lazy incor:i.petent govern-
. ment to a.n efficient one. An efficient government ,:muld move to the con­
tract curve, but once there, might decide to move along it by squeezing 
profits. It may be in the private sector's interest to kee;p the government 
as a satisficer by giving it enough g
0 to keep it stable and content, even 
though this sacrifices efficiency, 
This simple analysis covers only two variables. In the real world, 
the government woulc;-; no doubt: be interested in other targets (employment~ 
output, etc.). These also vary as·g
1 varies. A specification of social 
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welfare functions uould be llt'.:!Cessary to analyze_ the I'lOre complex case. 
dXl dLFor the moment we may merely note that the derivat:Lves -1- , d- ~ etc.cgl gl
all have different values and there is no unique maximum for the society. 
IV. A DYN.MHC HODEL 
l1ovements along the efficiency frontier for g
0 and fr have important 
dynamic implications which should be taken into account when choosing the 
appropriate government fiscal policy. Profits are one of the major sources 
of private savings in underdeveloped countries and the level of fr becomes 
an important detenninant of the rate of private capitel formation. In a 
similar vein, the government uses some part of its surplus, g
0 , for capital 
formation and development. A particular combina.tion of fr artd g
0 
in one 
period determir:es the level and mix of private and public inv2stment and 
hence the rate of growth of. the economy. 
Suppose, for example, government investment is zero and that the pri­
vate sector reinvests some fraction s
1 of i_ts net profits. The greater 
the level of fr permitted the private sector 1 the greater the rate of capital 
formation and hence the greater the outward shift in the efficiency frontier. 
This is illustrated in Figure 8 which shows the efficiency frontier of period 
(t + 1) corresponding tq a choice of point A1 B, C, or Din period (t). 
If point A is chosen so that ft= 0 and g
0 is a maximum, no capital formation 
occurs and the efficiency frontier remains stationary. If point Dis c"hosen 
so that P is zero and fr a maximum., the efficiency frontier shifts to theoo 
maximum possible exj:ent. B anc} C are intermedia•te choices. 
The government's choice of g
0 dn one period thus affects its possibil­
ity of choice in the next period and so on ad infinitum. The optimum choice 
from the government's point of view depends upon its horizon and time pref­
erence. Suppose, for exam.ple, the government's time horizon extends only 
one period and it derives no utility from iT. He assume then that at (t + 1) 
- 23a -
Figure 8 
Efficiency Front:i·er for g nnd ir
.. 0 
the governrr.ent uill choose the point where fr(t -:- 1) :: 0 anc! g
0 
(t + 1) :f.s 
a maximum. A one period Fisher productio~i possibilities curve can then 
be derived from Figure C showing for each g
0 
at time (t), the amom,t of 
s
0 
obtainable at (t + l):* 
*The well-known fonnula for deriving the. present valus of g
0 
_!10H andBo next period is 
\•Jhere :t is the discount rate. This uill be max:tmized 1-1hen 




or> i :::, .. [F 1 (,,· ) -'-, 1)"'0' . 
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A more interesting model allows both the public and privc.1.te sectors 
to contribute to cap:Ltal formation. There are two types of cap:.i.tc:l stock 
used by the prtvate sector; K
1 
which _is the private capital stock consist-· 
ing of plant, equipment 9 etc.~ and K
2 
which :i.s the public capital stock 
consistine of infrastructure, human capital, etc. Private investment is 
a function of profits and public investHcnt is a function of revenue. The 
basic model is as follows: 
(3.1) \~ y = F(K1, K2' L) 
(3.2) Il = sfr - s (1 t) 1T 
(3. 3) 12 = g t 1T 
(3.4) go - G - 12 
where: 
y = total private output
; 
= private caryital stock 
=== public capital stock 
L = labor employed in Y 
1
1 
= private investment 
~) ~,.t,\ ;'c.r2 ::; ~r1vate investment 
s = private savings rate 
g government savings rate 
t -- tax rate on profits 
1
(rr) 
fr -- private profits net of taxes 
g = public surplus0 
G = total government expenditure 
*(3.1) is assumed to be a constant retur~s to scale production function. 
~ifferentiating (3.1) totally? we have -"• 
(3.5) dY = £
1 

















:a: w where w is the wage rate assumed given 
(i.e.~ we assume a perfectly elastic supply of labor gt the given w). ~'; 
(3, 5) can then be rewr.i tten as 
(1.6) dY - w dL = £1 11 +f2 12 , or 
(3.7) dn = t 1 s(l - t) n + £2 g CTI 
where we have used equations (3. 2) and (3. 3). 
(3. ·n can be converted into a growth equati9n showing the rate of 
grOT.vth of private profits in terms of the two instrumental variables> t 
and g, as follows: 
The government l however, is interested in its sur1Jlus (g
0
). There is then 
a relationship between n* and the relative public private sur~lus ratiogo 
(n) as follows: . 
By definition, g
0 
= (1 - g) t Tr where tn == G [see equation (3. 4)], and
fo
gt = t - - Substituting this into the growth equation (3. 8) we haveTI 
go
(3. 9) 1p', ::: fl s(l ·­ t) + f 
2 
( t - -) •
Tf 
For a given t, n* == F(gO) where < o.
Tl 
*The partial derivatives? f., indicate the relevant marginal
productivities of the private ana public capitel, and labor. 
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These growth equations can be used to illustrate the growth paths asso;_ 
ciated with different levels of the instrumental variables g and t, To an­
ticipate our results 1 the model shows that the government must choose among 
growth paths such as the ones depicted in Figure 9. Path A has a higher ini­
tial level of g
0 
than Path B but a louer rate of growth. Path B sacrifices 
· present g0 but generates a higher rate of growth given a higher initial g or 
lower t than Path A. 
Let us now turn to the derivation of the government's decision rules forSo
a given (-). Differentiating equation (3. 9) partially with respect to t re-1T 
80veals that for a given (-.;) the growth rate of rr and g0 rises or falls as t 
increases ,depending on whether f s;.:;< f or1 > 2' 
•where -ih* ~ 0 as £
1 
s => f.at > < 2 • 
This result can be given a straightforward interpretation. f 2 is the pro­
ductivity of a dollar 1 s worth of investment in public capital formation.· £1s 
is the productivity of a dollar's worth of tax reduction to the private sector 
taking into account both the productivity of private capital and the leakage into pri­
vate -consU111ption. For a given level of g
0 , the government will wish to have 
all capital for.mati.on taking place either in K
1 or K2 depending upon whether 
f1s ~ £2. 
He can summarize the results of this model in the following two decision, 
rules: 
Case 1. If f 2 > f 1s, the government sets t at a maximum, i.e. equal to 1, thus 
reducing private investment to zero. The growth equation then becomes 
. go,r* = f 
2 
(1 - -;) , 











Path A~ Higher initial t but 101/·er rate of gr m1th.0 
Pa.th B: Sacrifice present g tut hir;her rate of gr.mvth as hishe.r initial0 
.!i g0 :i.s sp2nt only on comiumpt:Lons th2n proclen. o..1ly of time preference, 
I 
Case 2. government sets public capital formation at zero 
go
and raises taxes only for g01 i.e., t = - • The growth equation then becomes1T 
80
ir* == fls (1 - --; ) 
and again there is a trade-off between the share of profits devoted to g0 
~nd the. rate of grm-.rthl) the higher the t the lower the rate of grm.rth. 
These two cases. however. illustrate only partial solutions, since 
they assume f,s 
J. 
and f2 uill remain constant over time. In fact, they 1:-1il 
K1vary as t.be ratio of 17 changes. 
"2 
Kl . . f 1s .;- w:i.11 fall and I;- will rise until f s -
2
. In Case 2, K = 0 and£ i•;1·~2 1 2 
. - K f s 
K1* > Ol) therefore K
1 rises and /- vHl fall. 
2 2 
The equilibrium growth path w-ill always, therefore, tend to what we 
Kl
call Case 3 where £1s = £2. Along the equilibrium growth path, K Hill 
.. 2 
equal K*. the particular public private Ca!)ital ratio which equates 
f 
1
s to f • The ratio of 1 to r ~dll also have to be equal to K* to2 1 2 
maintain the growth path. We can then solve fort along; this equilibrium 
path as follows: 




· 1 + K ~- nTherefore, t = -----
Cl + K) 
Our major conclusion from this model that the government must choose 
·between (gO) d ' 1 h d h-
1T 
an 1T~ stil ol s. T is can easi1y be seen by once again 
turnirig to equatfon (3. 9) and letting fis = £ for_ equilibrium. This2 I 
I 
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yields 
!?:o 
f s (1 - --)
1 . Tr 
,80
and the government's choice betxveen Tr~': and b-) is again evident. 
'1f 
We may_now briefly examine some of the factors which enter into the 
government's choice of growth })aths. First? let us sup;.Jose g is spent
0 
entirely on public consumption in the interest of either the nation as a 
whole or some particular group in· control. The optimization problem is 
then simply one of time preference. Given a time rate of d;!.scount, the 
government can choose_ the income stream that maximizes the present dis~­
counted value of a stream of g with initial value g and a rate of growth0 0 
It is, however, more interesting and relevant to assume that g is used,
0 
at least in part? for general developmental purposes or for some other 
productive activity. Suppose g is used as an investment in another sector0 
Y2 which will also feed back revenue to the eovernment when it becomes 
productive. Sup~ose that this alternate outlet for investment funds has a 
rate of return of r 
2 
• The flow of funds to the government is now composed 
of two streams: the first is g e r1,t the surplus gen2rated by the sector0 
r 2tY analyzed above; the second stream is 8
0
e ~ the stream generated by 
investing g
0 
in a development pro8ram. The funds av.e.ilable to the ~overn­
tWe would calculate the present discounted value of J~ g (O)e <sol'~-.r) tdt
0 
where r is the discount rate, and T the end of the planning period. Inte-
gO(O) (g *-r)T
grating we have .,. [e O -1].
8"·-r 
Given that g l't ""' F(; ) the maximum could be calculated from the o_ oint of. · 0 °0 ' view of the government. 
1 
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ment at some future point will therefore be; 
The government will maximize the discounted value of this stream~ keeping 
in mind that r 1 is a declining function of fo• (It is also lilr.e]_y that r 2 
Hill be a declining function of g0 if there are diminishing returns·. A 
more realistic variant, too complicated to analyze here, is to assume that 
the development program has a long gestation period so that for the first 
n years it yields zero return. 
Finally, we explore a model in which the government invests in a 
capital stock which increases the_productiv;ity of labor il"l the government 
sector itself. He assume that there is a government production function 
relating output of the government sector to its oun capital stock 2.nd to 
labor employed by the government 
(4.1) G = G (K, L).* 
Labor is available 
I
in unlimited amounts at a fixed wage rate w. Government 
investment is the surplus of revenue over wages 
(lf,2) I= r. - wL 
We further assume that R is L~etermined autonomously and grows at a 
constant rate Ri,. A balanced growth path is then defined in Hhich all 
variables are growing at the same rate: 
G* = K* = L* =I*= R*. 
t:The government production function is assumed to be a constant returns ,
to scale function. 
In this model, the government's instrumental variable is its savings 
rate, i. e,, the fraction of total revenue in each period which it devotes 
to its own investment. The choice is illustrated in Figure 10 for arbi-. 
trary levels of R. We assume that the government chooses an e2cpansion path 
. I.implying a constant savings rate R. It is easy to show that given an 
exogeneousl.y determined rate of growth of R, there is one optimum sevings 
rate that provides the highest possible grm-,th path for G. 'i'here exists 
then a golden rule for government investment alo,:i~ a balanced growth path 
equal to P)', which is the analogue to the natural grm:th r&te. 
We know that alon;; the balanced growth path, capital grows at the same 
rate as revenue or I = ::R,.,. Substituting this in equation (Lf. 2) above, 
,-1e obtain for any point of time 
(4. 3) R = R* K + wL. 
This equation provides the government with the opportunity cost of ca!lital 
and labor. The government can vary· its capital la.bar ratio by varying its 
savings rate as long es it satisfies equation (4.3). 
The :;,roblem for the government is to choose the IC and L which maximizes 
G (equation (4.1)) subject to the constraint that R = R1~ I( + ~1L. The solu­
tion is :Ulustrated graphically in Figure 11. The maximum occurs where the 
fl Hratio of the mar,ginal productivity of labor and ce.pitaL -- equa]c - -- , f 2 $ ~ -~- R 
This is the gcilden rule for the government. 
It is interesting to relate.this to other formulations of the golden 
rule. By Euler's theorem, 
and by equation (4.3) above, 







Suppose we assume that we can convert the government's equation to monetary 
-terms by multiplying through by P such that PG== R.g In other words, weg 
assume (as is the usual practice) that the value of government output is 
equal to the value of total revenue and to expen¢liture by the government in 
investment and on labor. Our equa·tions would then read: 
PG= P f 1L + P f 2Kg g g 
R -· wL + pJqz. 
fl wSince f 
2 
= i,'>. we conclude that 
w = 
Along the golden rule path, the margin~l revenue product of capital equals 
the growth rate and the marginal revenue product of labor equals the wage 
rate •. It is important to note that :i,.n order to obtain this result, we as­
sumed that the value of government output in any year equalled the value 
of current expenditures plus capital expenditures. The true definition of 
total value should be current expenditure, wL, plus imputed capital costs. 
Our fonnula requires the assumption that capital costs should be imputed at 
the rate of growth Ric. 




The bargaining model can be written as follows (definition of var­
iables are found in the t.ext): 
2. K = K 
Bx p
13. w = L 
4. 
I 
R = tn = t(l 
5. ft = (1 t)n 
Equation 1 describes the production function for the private sec­
tor. It is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas. In this production function, 
the effect of g is like neuttal technological change in the sense that1 
it does not affect the marginal rates of substitution between Kand L. 
For many purposes, it would be more interesting and relevant to explore 
the possibility that government expenditure on, say, research or edu­
cation is biased towards capital or labor. Note that g is assumed to1 
be a flow whereas many government activities, e.g., roads and darns are 
better viewed as a capital stock. The model might be viewed as describ­
:i.ng periods of tiri1e longer than one year, or if viewed as a. short-run 
model, as covering only the recurrent expenditure of government on main-
taining roads, providing information, etc. 
Equation 2 assumes that the private capital is fixed in the period 
of consideration. 
Equation 3 indicates that labor is hired up to the point where the 
wage rate equals the marginal product. Because of the Cobb-Douglas as-
- 2 -
sumption and the assumption of constant wages and_ prices, this yields 
an expression for labor as a simple non-linear function of x :
1 
L = PSX 
w 1 
Equation lf shows total revenue for the government (equal to total 
expenditure) as a constant ratio of profits. Profits before tax is 
the residual after paying wages and because of the Cobb-Douglas assump­
tion is a constant share of output. 
Equations 5 and 6 derive respectively profits after tax (ft) and 
total Rand G. 
-----
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The two families can be combined on a single diagram as in 
Figure 7A. The tangend.es of iso-profit and iso-surplus curves 
yield the contract curve for the specific model in this appendix. 
As noted, the general case is found in the text. 
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